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I. INTRODUCTION
Scotland is in a relatively new position within the United Kingdom (U.K.)
and the global community. Having spent a millennium or more as a sovereign
nation-with its own culture, economy, laws, and even monarchy-Scotland
joined with England (and Wales) in creating the United Kingdom of Great
Britain by ratifying the Articles of Union with the passage of the Union with
England Act of 1707 (the Union).' Within a few years of the Union, however,
Scots fought to restore their independence.2 For many, the fight continues
today. With the U.K.'s massive constitutional overhaul of the past two
decades,' including the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament and the
devolution to Scotland of some aspects of national governance and sovereignty
(under the Scotland Act of 1998),5 the issue of independence has gained
renewed significance.' In the 2007 Scottish parliamentary elections, for
instance the Scottish National Party (SNP) made an incredible showing; a
"central plank" of the SNP platform is a referendum for independence.7
Parallel developments across the U.K. include increased devolution of powers
1 The Articles (or Treaty) of Union, signed on July 22, 1706, led to "Acts of Union" that were
passed by the separate parliaments of both England and Scotland. The pre-Union Scottish
Parliament passed the Union with England Act on January 16, 1707. Union with England
Act, 1707, Scot. Parl. Acts xi 406, c. 7, available at http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1706/10/257. The
pre-Union English Parliament passed the Union with Scotland Act later that same year. Union with
Scotland Act, 1706,6 Ann., c. 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?
activeTextDocld=2078400. Both Acts worked to dissovie the former national governments of
England and Scotland and replaced them with a single United Kingdom of Great Britain. See infra
Part II.B (setting out the provisions of the Union with England Act in more detail).
2 T.B. SMITH, SCOTLAND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTruTION 55 (1962).
In 1711, for instance, "a motion was actually made in the House of Lords to dissolve the Union
in protest at the abolition of the Scottish Privy Council" and other parliamentary actions
targeting Scottish participation. Id.
' Maria Dakolias, Are We There Yet?: Measuring Success of Constitutional Reform, 39
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1168-69 (2006) (claiming that the majority of Scots believe that
Scotland should be governed by the Scottish Executive).
4 Id at 1118.
' Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl998/ukp
ga_19980046en1; Dakolias, supra note 3, at 1118, 1167.
6 See, e.g., Fergus Ewing & Jennifer Erickson, The Case for Scottish Independence, 25
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2001, at 89.
' Hector L. MacQueen, Scots LawNews, Scottish Parliamentary Election 2007: The Union
Challenged?, 11 EDINBURGH L. REv. 295, 296 (2007). The SNP is now the most represented
party in the Scottish Parliament, with forty-seven seats against forty-six Labour and thirty-six
other seats. Id.
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to Wales and Northern Ireland, the establishment of a U.K. Supreme Court,8
and the increasing influence of European Law on the U.K.9
While many Scots would like more, or even absolute, independence from
the Parliament at Westminster, it remains to be seen how recent developments
have affected this goal. This is a question of the constitutional situation-in-fact,
and of the legal justification for future independence-directed actions by the
Scottish Parliament. It is not a question of policy, though policy may inform
some aspects of the discussion. The argument proceeds from the Scottish
constitution and legal system, as opposed to the U.K. system or the English
system. By examining the respective effects of the Scotland Act of 1998, the
establishment of the U.K. Supreme Court, British economic policy, and the
influence of European Union law on the U.K. and Scottish constitutions, this
Note argues that Scottish independence is consistent with the still-extant
Scottish constitution and is potentially on the horizon.
The legislative, economic, and judicial avenues of independence are all
available, and each can justifiably be utilized. Part II of this Note begins with
a brief legal history of Scotland and culminates with a description of the U.K.'s
constitutional arrangement under the Union. Part III describes the powers
devolved to Scotland and reserved to Westminster under the Scotland Act of
1998, and discusses the introduction of the U.K. Supreme Court and the
supranational impact of European Union law. Part IV analyzes the legal
justifications of possible paths to independence, based on the evolution of the
Scottish constitution. Part V concludes with a suggestion that Scotland would
be constitutionally justified in regaining complete independence.
II. SCOTTISH LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
A. Early Influences and Development
In any legal argument for a nation's independence, it is particularly
important to emphasize the nation's independent legal and constitutional
development. This is especially true where neither the parent country nor the
country asserting independence has a unitary, written constitution. Scotland's
legal and constitutional development began in the middle of the first
millennium after Christ, and has been subject to multiple influences since
8 Robert Walker, The New Supreme Court and Other Changes in the Justice System, 6
LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 292 (2006).
9 Dakolias, supra note 3, at 1167; David Jenkins, Both Ends Against the Middle: European
Integration, Devolution, and the Sites of Sovereignty in the United Kingdom, 16 TEMP. INT'L&
COMP. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2002).
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then.' The various tribes inhabiting the area now known as Scotland-the
Picts, the Scots of Dalriada, the Britons in the southwest, and the Angles in the
southeast--each followed already-developed practices of governance and
law." The Picts, for instance, had a distinctive system of royal succession
based on maternal heredity, which was otherwise unknown in Western
European history.'2
The Dalriadic Scots, on the other hand, were the dominant influence on
early Scottish legal development. Their systems can be traced to the Dalriadic
dynasty of Ireland.'3 Geographically defined and ethnically distinct, these
groups gradually came under the rule of a single monarch: "In the middle of
the 9th century, the Picts... came under the kingship of Kenneth mac Alpin
of the Dalriadic dynasty."' 4 Kenneth I founded "the kingdom of Alba, or
Scotia, the forerunner of the later Scottish kingdom... [which] expanded in
the 10th and 11 th centuries to incorporate both the British south-west and the
Anglo-Saxon south east."' 5 The Scots' victory over the Northumbrians in 1018
also served as a major catalyst in this geographic expansion. 6 The Scottish
mainland was under monarchic rule by the eleventh century, with a legal
10 W. David H. Sellar, A Historical Perspective, in THE SCOT-ISH LEGAL TRADITION 29, 31
(Scott C. Styles, ed., 1991).
" See id. at 31 (describing the notable, unique governance practices of each group). The
Picts were an aboriginal tribe that inhabited the east, from modem-day Edinburgh and
Northumbria, and the north, including the area ofAberdeen, Inverness, the northern Highlands,
and the Grampian Mountains. JAMES BALFOUR & HENRY MAULE, THE HISTORY OF THE PICTS,
CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR ORIGINAL, LANGUAGE, MANNERS, GOVERNMENT,
RELIGION, BOUNDS AND LIMITS OF THEIR KINGDOM 31-33 (printed by Robert Freebaim, 1706).
Their name comes from the Latin picti, meaning "painted men." OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY
1377 (P.G.W. Glare ed., 1982). The Scots were of Irish ancestry and inhabited primarily the
west and southwest, including the Western Isles. Sellar, supra note 10, at 31 (noting that the
Scots came from Dalriada, and that Ireland was "the original home of the Gaelic language and
the Dalriadic dynasty"). Both territories overlapped at various points with those of the Angles
and Britons, who advanced from the south in the early centuries of the first millennium.
DUNCAN H. MACNEILL, THE HISTORICAL SCOTTISH CONSTIruTION 24-25 (1971).
12 Sellar, supra note 10, at 31.
1 Id. The Cain Adomnain is one example of early Scottish legal writing, negotiated between
several Scottish and Irish tribes, and resulting in "a... Dark Age Geneva Convention" from 697
A.D., which protected women and children from battle. Id. at 32.
14 Id. at 31.
15 Id.
16 DAVID M. WALKER, THE SCOTTISH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
SCOTS LAW 113 (8th ed. 2001). The new Scottish kingdom included everything north of
Glasgow and the Strathclyde area in the west, as well as Edinburgh, Lothian, and the Borders
in the east (basically modem-day Scotland). A. Grant, Scotland in the Central Middle Ages, in
ATLAS OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE 80 (Angus MacKay & David Ditchbum eds., 1997) (showing a
map illustrating the expansion of the kingdom of Alba).
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system that became further consolidated over the next two centuries.17 The
period was characterized by a system of provinces with subsidiary "thanages,"
or estates, which were responsible for local administration. 8
Following the expansion of Gaelic-Pictish Alba and its administrative
system, the next major influence on Scottish legal development was feudal law,
introduced after the Norman invasion of England in 1066.9 The effects of the
invasion were not immediately felt by Scotland; it was not until about 1081 that
Normans began entering Scotland.2" However, by about 1150, Scotland was
"Normanised beyond recall."2' Thus, the feudal system of governance that had
already dominated in Europe was gradually implemented in Scotland, where
it was seen that "the best way for rulers to consolidate power was through
subordinate feudal knights and castle-based lordships." 2   This type of
arrangement allowed the "rulers of the kingdom ... to shape a law which was
largely national rather than local, co-terminous with the bounds of their
kingdom, a common law. 23
Some elements of feudal governance were easily accepted in Scotland,
given their similarity to old norms. The feudal land-tenure system was, in one
sense, well-suited to assimilation with the previous Celtic practices: under the
older Gaelic-Pictish system, land was held by the "chief and his near
kindred., 24 Subsequent to Norman influence, and with little "disposition," the
same land was now held by "a 'vassal' from a lord," conferred by "royal
charter" on "native Scottish chiefs, who had their customary rights confirmed
and enlarged by the grant of feudal jurisdiction."25
The land-tenure aspect of feudalism was thus largely superimposed on the
preexisting Scottish land law structure.26 On the other hand, the prior Scottish
system was one based on patriarchy and family relations, 7 hence the continued
use of the words "chief," "families," "clan," and so on.2' The king himself was
17 See Sellar, supra note 10, at 33-35 (discussing the development of Scotland's Common
Law system).
" Grant, supra note 16, at 79.
19 Id.
2 WALKER, supra note 16, at 114.
2! Id. (quoting ROBERT RiTCHIE, NORMANS IN SCOTLAND, at xv (1954)).
22 Grant, supra note 16, at 79.
23 Sellar, supra note 10, at 33-34.
24 WALKER, supra note 16, at 115-16; see also Grant, supra note 16, at 79 (discussing the
feudalization of Scotland).
25 WALKER, supra note 16, at 115.
26 Id. at 115-16.
27 MACNEILL, supra note 11, at 15.
28 Id. at 15-16.
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seen as the "chief' or "patriarch" of the people.29 Land had thus already been
held in a way that could be described as hierarchical, but not as part of a
formalistic feudal system such as that which was practiced in Europe and
imposed on newly-conquered Norman England. 3' After the introduction of the
feudal land tenure system, moreover, the Old Celtic patriarchal and clan-
oriented aspect of the Scottish identity, and the Scottish constitution, retained
its ancient meaning.31 While the superficial structure was adopted with relative
ease, the underlying societal and constitutional assumptions appear to have
remained thoroughly Scottish.
Other feudal requirements were also markedly different from the prior
Scottish system. The Normans encountered some basic constitutional
principles or assumptions which were too firmly ingrained to be dislodged.
One example relates to the familiar English tort principle that "the King can do
no wrong., 32 Though "the idea that the King was lord of the whole land and
the fountain of all justice" was introduced by feudalism and accepted in
Scotland in the thirteenth century, 3 the Scots never held that the King was
actually beyond the law (until 1897, when their own courts erroneously and
with "but a weak foundation" imported that notion from English tort law).34
Rather, one of Scotland's most significant constitutional documents makes
quite clear that the king is emphatically not beyond the law, and is bound by
the Scottish constitution. 35 The Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 states:
Quem si ab inceptis desisteret, Regi Anglorum aut Anglicis nos
aut regnum nostrum volens subjicere, tanquam inimicum nostrum
et sui nostriquejuris subversorem, statim expellere niteremur, et
alium regem nostrum qui ad defensionem nostram sufficeret
faciemus.36
29 Id. at 15.
30 See WALKER, supra note 16, at 115 (noting that "[tihe [feudal land tenure] system was by
this time well developed in England and on the Continent").
31 See id. at 116 ("By the end of the thirteenth century, old Celtic institutions had been
feudalised,... however, Celtic custom in the main lasted for sever more centuries.").
32 SMITH, supra note 2, at 65.
3 WALKER, supra note 16, at 116.
3 SMITH, supra note 2, at 65.
3- Id. at 49-50.
316 Id. at 50 ("But if he should leave off from his first principle, and willingly subject us or
our kingdom to the King of the English or to the English people, we would immediately seek to
drive him out as our enemy and the subverter of his law and ours, and would make for ourselves
another king who would rise to our defense." (author's translation) (emphasis added)).
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This declaration provides a clear indication of Scotland's tradition that royal
power flows from the people. It is a tradition which, from earliest times, has
been a powerful force in Scottish political thought and in the development of
the Scottish constitution.
In contrast, feudal law introduced a new administrative organization,
probably at the hand of David I.3' Like the feudal land-tenure system, this new
administration, including the office of "sheriff," was probably well-received,
as "[a] network of sheriffdoms began to spread over the whole country."38
"The Scottish sheriffdom seems to have been an artificial unit which did not
coincide with previous divisions of the land or natural boundaries"; it created
an officer of the king who was responsible for judicial, financial,
administrative, and military matters.39 Sheriffs held court at their local castles,
deciding over civil and criminal matters.4° The sheriff court survives today as
the basic unit of the Scottish judicial system." Moreover, the decentralized
network, of which the sheriffs were a part, gave the kingdom greater
administrative efficiency than previously existed.42  To a great extent this
system rested on, and continued to reflect, protection for the individual. The
office was new, but it was adapted to the pre-existing Scottish mindset that
perceived government as a creation of the people. 3 Whereas the feudal land-
tenure system matched pre-existing Scottish customs and was therefore easily
adapted to, the feudal system of governance introduced by the Normans did not
displace the Scottish approach wherein power began at the local level with
municipal assemblies." Power thus seems to have flowed upward through the
" See WALKER, supra note 16, at 117, 122 (discussing David I's introduction of "political
officers and institutions of the feudal monarchy" and sheriffs offices in Scotland).
38 Id. at 117.
3 Id. at 122.
40 Id.
4' Michael C. Meston, Scots Law Today: Scotland's Place in the International Legal Order,
in THE SCOTTISH LEGAL TRADITION, supra note 10, at 1, 4-5.
42 WALKER, supra note 16, at 118 (noting that "the inadequate central machinery of
government, combined with feudal theory to effect a wide dispersion of judicial functions and
powers... all over the country"). Of particular importance was the development of the burghs,
which were "fundamentally economic organisations acting as market-centres for the
sheriffdoms." Id. at 118-19. These organisations exemplified the type of local unit that
managed governance and would represent its constituents in the greater Scottish Parliament. See
id. at 130 (noting that the early Parliament was composed of representatives of the three estates,
including the "clergy, tenants-in-chief, and burgesses").
3 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
See MACNE.L, supra note 11, at 105-07 (describing the locally oriented Scottish system
of governance wherein, even after the introduction of feudalism, "[t]he power of rejecting or
accepting the advice of their governors was exercised by the Scots" through a referendum-like
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newly-feudalized, and now administrative, family- and clan-based network.
This is yet another example of the vitality of the Scottish constitution and its
ability to withstand and adapt to new ideas and structures without losing its
unique character.
The introduction of feudalism also affected the judicial system in Scotland.
Under the feudal system, but also in his traditional role as patriarch, the
Scottish king held court to settle appeals in important matters, sitting with
members of his household and other important persons.45 Eventually, the king
used the feudal network to call to court representatives of the three social
estates: clerics representing the Church; "tenants-in-chief" representing the
family; and burgesses representing the burghs.46 This was the beginning of
Parliament. The parliamentum, the first sitting of the three estates, was
recorded in 1326. 4' Though Parliament began as a judicial body with the king
as its head, it soon took on legislative functions deriving from the king's
authority,48 but was always representative of the people and sustained by their
power.
And so, a kingdom-wide system developed from the manifold practices of
various groups, beginning under Kenneth I, and became feudalized under
David I. The Scottish legal system was based on longstanding tradition,
decentralization, and the rule of law, the power of which reached even the
sovereign.
Like the feudal network's historical development, the structure of the pre-
union Scottish legislature also reveals the concern, inherent in the Scottish
constitution, for local control over local affairs. The original Scottish
Parliament was unicameral, for it grew out of the sittings of the king's court.49
It evolved into an elected body, comprised of "ninety commissioners from the
shires, sixty-seven from the burghs, and a like number of peers in regular
attendance."5 These delegates, particularly the burghal representatives, were
elected by the town councils, comprising and representative of the merchant
and craftsman classes.5 ' Thus, the Scottish Parliament was a national
"local veto" system that permitted refusal or acceptance of directives by the local parish or
parish council).
" WALKER, supra note 16, at 116.
4 Id. at 117.
41 University of St. Andrews: Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, A Short
History, http://www.rps.ac.uk (follow "A Short History" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
4 WALKER, supra note 16, at 130-31.
4 SMITH, supra note 2, at 70; see also WALKER, supra note 16, at 130-31 (discussing the
origin of the Scottish Parliament).
so SMITH, supra note 2, at 70.
51 Id.
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legislative body almost directly accountable at the local level to most of its
constituents: "Parliament could legislate, but the people in their local councils
decided whether or not to put the enactments into operation. 52 This local
control waned after 1707."
It is no surprise that the dominant nation, England, imposed its own legal
philosophy on Scotland through acts of Parliament and through judicial
decisions, but it is important to note that this philosophy is fundamentally at
odds with the Scottish approach. Scotland began as an amalgamation of ethnic
groups gradually coming under the rule of a monarch, but keeping sovereignty
in the hands of the people. The power flowed upward from the people to the
patriarchal king.54 The people "followed" the king because they had given him
power to lead, not because he was naturally endowed with autocratic authority
over them."
In contrast, England fell under a sovereign that gained his power by
conquering the natives and establishing himself as the supreme power.56 The
Norman laws imposed by William the Conqueror were social controls meant
to protect the supremacy of the king, and the feudal system provided the
network through which those controls were exerted on the conquered English."
Scotland, on the other hand, was not conquered by the Normans, but rather
accepted the gradual influx of Normans and their ideas.5" These ideas were
adapted to the existing Scottish system, and the philosophical underpinnings
of the Scottish constitution did not change.5 9 The English constitution is based
on the idea that law is something a superior can impose upon an inferior; the
Scottish constitution presents the law as something protecting the individual
from inappropriate imposition by the titular sovereign.6"
52 MACNELL, supra note I1, at 38.
13 See infra Part II.B (discussing the Union with England Act of 1707).
14 See MACNEILL, supra note 11, at 38-39 (describing the lack of enforcement power of the
Scottish king absent support of the various "clansmen").
" See id. at 38 (explaining how the Scottish Constitution evolved, giving "the people the
power to control their rulers"). Scotland was a nation under almost constant threat of invasion,
and it was the repulsion of these invasions that united the country behind their king, their chosen
leader. Id. at 105.
56 Id. at 106-07.
7 Id. at 106-08.
58 WALKER, supra note 16, at 114.
5' See supra pp. 447-48 (noting the feudal land-tenure system was superimposed onto a pre-
existing, and complementary, Scottish land-tenure system). It is the position of this Note that,
because the old land-tenure system was essentially retained, it makes good sense to suppose that
the constitutional ideal of land-tenure also was retained.
6 Compare MACNEILL, supra note 11, at 58, 106-07 (describing the English as "a
conquered people with the Normans self-imposed as a military aristocracy" whose constitution
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Moreover, though in modem Britain it is Parliament, and not the Crown,
that has become more sovereign and that exercises legislative control," the
Scottish conception of the monarchy was fundamentally different from the
English conception.62 In addition to the Declaration of Arbroath, other
documents display the same Scottish abhorrence of granting the king unlimited
power.63 For instance, the Claim of Right of 1689 "declared that James VII [of
Scotland] by abuse of prerogative powers had altered the fundamental
constitution of the kingdom 'from a legal limited monarchy to an arbitrary
despotick power ... whereby he hath forefaulted the right to the Crown, and
the throne is become vacant.' "6 Thus, any policies effected by Westminster
(whether by Parliament in its legislative capacity or the House of Lords in its
judicial capacity) post-Union would be antithetical to the Scottish constitution
to the extent that these policies afforded the monarch more authority than he
or she would otherwise have been due.
Though the early Scottish constitution may be seen as protective of the
individual, personal freedom was not explicitly dealt with therein.65
Considering the extent to which the early Scottish constitution protected the
rights of the citizenry from abuse at the hands of the monarch, it may seem
surprising that so many fundamental constitutional liberties were not
enumerated until the last century or two.6 6  On the other hand, their
enumeration is only part of a process, and would not have occurred unless the
rights were already part of the constitutional scheme.
enshrines "the powers of conquerors ... wrested from the crown by parliament, yet ...
[nonetheless] intact"), with id. at 123 ("Let us conclude the picture of [the Scottish] constitution
by seeing it as a kind of umbrella, in the shelter of which [Scottish] citizens went about their
business undisturbed by the commands of an omnipotent sovereign ....").
61 See Dakolias, supra note 3, at 1118, 1167 (discussing the shift in rule and governance in
the United Kingdom).
62 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 62-65 (describing the powers of the Scottish Crown and
noting some important differences between it and the English Crown).
63 Id. at 62-63 (discussing the Claim of Right, 1689, by which the Scots "declared that James
VII by abuse of prerogative powers have altered the fundamental constitution of the kingdom"
and thereby forfeited the throne, as opposed to corresponding English documents that referred
to James as having "abdicated"; also discussing the affirmative proclamation of Queen Elizabeth
in 1952, which may, strictly speaking, have been unnecessary, but which the Scots clearly felt
obliged to provide).
6Id. at 62.
5 Id. at 79. Smith elaborates, "[p]ersonal freedom rests on the common law," detailing the
modern law regarding freedom from arbitrary arrest, search, detention, and imprisonment; the
right to free expression of opinion; and the right of public meeting. Id. at 79-84.
" See id. at 79-84 (noting that many rights, such as freedom of expression and assembly,
were not enunciated until judicial decisions by the House of Lords in the last two centuries).
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Another important influence on the early Scottish constitution was civil law
and, through it, Roman law. As the Normans brought feudalism and
continuing Scottish contacts with France, they also brought a code-based
system that can be traced back to the Roman emperor Justinian.67 While some
scholars downplay the influence of civil law, at least as compared with the later
impact of English common law,6" others give civil law significant weight in
explaining the development of Scots law. 9 Of particular note is the importance
of civil law education for Scottish lawyers,7" and the traditional, if somewhat
mythical, concision of Scottish legislation.7 As one author states, "The Scots
law is based on statute";72 its "[c]ontact with the [English] Common Law has
turned [Scotland] into a mixed jurisdiction," though "Scotland in the general
lines of its legal development followed the Civilian tradition until ... 1707.'73
This Civilian tradition underscores both the uniqueness of Scottish law and the
displacement of traditional Scottish legal principles wrought by the United
Kingdom's House of Lords.74
B. The Union with England Act of 1 707
There is reason to conceive of the Union as having come about through the
independent but concerted actions of independent parliaments, though the
result was to dissolve each of the above and create one in their stead. That is,
two parliaments made the decision to create the United Kingdom of Great
Britain, which entailed the dissolution of each prior legislative body and the
establishment of a new, unitary legislature. 75 Keeping in mind what actually
67 Sellar, supra note 10, at 46.
6 See WALKER, supra note 16, at 139 (claiming that, despite "sixteenth century...
references to Roman law,... its influence was not great").
69 See generally WILLIAM M. GORDON, RoMAN LAW, SCOTs LAW AND LEGAL HIsTORY 303
(2007) (discussing the Roman heritage of Scots law, which is "based on statute," and noting that
"Scotsmen... [before the fifteenth century] went to the universities of the Continent" in search
of an education in Roman law).
70 See REINARDZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW: THE
CIVILIAN TRADITION TODAY 152 (2001) (noting the introduction of civil law to Scottish legal
culture and education in the eighteenth century).
71 See Nigel Jamieson, The Scots Statute - Style and Substance, 28 STATUTE L. REv. 182,
190 (2007) (discussing the brevity and "dryness of wit" of Scottish statutes, though taking issue
with a characterization of Scots statutes as "Lacedaemonian").
72 GORDON, supra note 69, at 303.
7 Id. at 323.
7 SMITH, supra note 2, at 87-88; see also infra Part III (detailing the effects of the Union
on Scottish legal principles).
" Union with England Act, 1707, Scot. Parl. Acts xi 406, c. 7, art. I, available at http://
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happened-the unification of two separate bodies into a single, new
body-brings into view the blatantly unequal continuation-in-fact of the
English Parliament alongside the mere dissolution of the Scottish Parliament.
Also, as there is no single, comprehensive constitutional document either
Scottish, English, or British, so there is no union, despite the custom of
referring to it as such.76 Rather, a series of negotiations resulted in a treaty as
well as "a complex [set] of documents" which "may, for convenience, be
described as the Union Agreement."' 77  The Union was the product of
negotiations between the Scottish and English Parliaments that began in earnest
with a proposed draft on July 22, 1706, with each country sending thirty-one
Commissioners to the bargaining table.78
A century earlier, the Union of the Crowns79 had occurred, under which
James VI of Scotland became James I of England, assuming sovereignty as the
head of both Scotland and England.80 Over the following century, several
attempts to more thoroughly unite the countries would fail, allowing old
animosities to continue.81 Scotland and England remained essentially separate
cultural and administrative entities, despite being ruled by the same monarch. 2
This century was also the period in which-following the death of Charles
I and the English opposition to the claim of Charles II, whom the Scottish
parliament had recognized immediately-Oliver Cromwell invaded Scotland.83
He had become "supreme" in England, and intended to "improve" Scotland and
take it under his control." Cromwell caused many swift governmental changes
after invading Scotland, including the temporary dissolution of Parliament
www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1706/10/257; SMITH, supra note 2, at 53.
76 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 52 & n. 16 (in the same way that the Scottish, English, and
British constitutions are all unwritten, but are rather comprised of entire bodies of written law,
so there is no single "Union," but there are a complex of documents, among the most important
of which is the Act of Union).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 53.
79 See WALKER, supra note 16, at 141 n.77 (noting that in fact, the crowns were not
"united"-the same person became King of Scotland and King of England, but each nation
retained its own crown).
80 MACNEILL, supra note 11, at 89.
81 See id. at 89-104 (detailing the attempts at governmental unification throughout the period
between the Union of the Crowns in 1603 and the Union in 1707).
82 WALKER, supra note 16, at 141-43 (discussing several attempts to harmonize Scottish and
English economies, cultures, and administrations, but showing that the kingdoms remained
essentially separate in these respects).
83 MACNEILL, supra note 11, at 94-95.
SId. at 95.
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(which reconvened in 1661).85 Cromwell also "appoint[ed] his supporters to
be Justices of the Peace on the English model, and Englishmen to be Judges of
the Court of Session. 86 Though ultimately unsuccessful, Cromwell's efforts
to Anglicize the Scottish legal system were, at that time, indicative of the
English project to subdue Scotland.87
After Cromwell died, Charles II was "restored to his throne" and recognized
by the English eleven years after the Scots had done so." Unfortunately,
Charles II shared Cromwell's desire to bring Scotland under English control,
and he and his successors (James VII of Scotland and II of England, and
William of Orange, who became William III after 1688) continued the efforts
to bring this result about.89 Significantly, under this Darien Scheme, William
"[let] it be known that any help given to the Scots [,specifically merchants,]
would be regarded by him with disfavour [sic]," and so the international
community was forestalled from doing business with Scottish entrepreneurs.9"
This action led to a period of economic hardship for the Scots, and the country
thus entered union negotiations in an artificially weakened state (due to the
English-imposed trade sanctions that stifled the Scottish economy).9 The
Union of 1707 was the product of a century-long movement that was not
without some opposition on both sides, Scottish and English. This opposition,
and the generally anti-Scottish behavior of the English establishment at the
time, may be seen as a precursor to the Union's consequences for Scotland.
The Union "[u]nited [the two kingdoms of Scotland and England] into One
Kingdom by the Name of Great Britain," and mandated that "the United
Kingdom of Great Britain be Represented by one and the same
Parliament .... Yet, even with the creation of the United Kingdom, there
appear to be clear examples of the intention to preserve significant aspects of
sovereignty to the two constituent nations. Though the two nations were
expected to come under a single legislature and become part of a new United
Kingdom, the Scottish and English constitutions continued to exist. One of the
" WALKER, supra note 16, at 145.
86 MAcNEILL, supra note 11, at 95.
87 See id. at 95-96 (noting that both Cromwell and, after his death, Charles, aimed to bring
Scotland under the control of the Parliament at Westminster).
88 Id. at 97.
89 See id. at 96-97 (noting that James VII and II "had no interest in an independent
Scotland," and that William III's Darien Scheme put the Scots "in the position of rebels" as
opposed to an independent nation).
90 Id. at 97.
9' See id. at 98-99 (providing details of Scotland's turmoil since 1702).
92 Union with England Act, 1707, Scot. Parl. Acts xi 406, c. 7, arts. I & III, available at
http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1 706/10/257.
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most important aspects of the Union is the preservation of Scots law: Article
XIX specifically provides for the continued independence of Scottish private
law and the judiciary.93 Specifically, the Union Agreement provides that no
English court would be competent to hear matters of Scots law.94 The
preservation of Scottish private law, of course, was subject to the caveat that
the United Kingdom Parliament could not alter "[l]aws which concern private
Right except for evident utility of the subjects of Scotland."'95 The "Publick"
law, moreover, was made subject to the U.K. Parliament, the relevant phrase
being that the public law could be made "the same" throughout the U.K.96
Despite the terms of Article XIX, the House of Lords quickly asserted
jurisdiction over civil appeals in Scottish cases-though nojustifying provision
existed in the Union documents.97 Nonetheless, since the continued force of
the prior Scottish legal system was clearly countenanced in the Union, it only
makes sense that the Scottish constitution survived. Without this result, there
would be no basis or guidance for the remaining legal system.
The voluntariness of the Union indicates that Scotland assented to the union
and, thus, to the dissolution of its own Parliament in acquiescence to rule by the
U.K. Parliament. Indeed, consent was given and negotiations were made;98 yet,
the practical consequences of the Union likely manifested themselves in a way
that the Scottish commissioners did not expect or particularly desire.
Beginning almost immediately and continuing through the following centuries,
Parliament consistently interpreted the Union in a distinctly anti-Scottish
manner.
As for the relationship between the Scottish, English, and overall British
constitutions, Parliament interpreted it in a potentially unconstitutional manner.
For instance, the Scottish Privy Council, "which had till then conducted
Scottish administration, was abolished" in 1708.9  This is particularly
surprising because, though technically allowed by the language of the Union,
" Id. art XIX; see also SMrrIH, supra note 2, at 53-54 (discussing the preservation of Scots
law after the Union); WALKER, supra note 16, at 155 (outlining preserved Scots law).
" Union with England Act, 1707, art XIX. Though, as one scholar puts it, "[t]he majority
Party in Parliament representing a minority of Scottish voters would not seem the appropriate
arbiter of 'evident utility.' " SMrrH, supra note 2, at 58 n.26.
" Union with England Act, 1707, art. XVIII.
% Id.
97 SMrrH, supra note 2, at 55; see also the Greenshield's case, infra text accompanying
notes 127-30 (reasoning that it was not another "court" at Westminster, but simply the upper
house of the legislature, the House of Lords, that appropriated jurisdiction of Scots appeals,
probably in contravention of the Union Agreement).
98 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 57 (detailing the negotiations).
99 Id. at 66.
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this move seems contrary to the Union's spirit.'0° The Union's preservation of
the Scottish private law and judiciary, coupled with the fact that the "Publick"
law was left mostly unchanged, implies that a significant amount of
sovereignty over national affairs was expected to remain with Scotland.1"'
Therefore, it seems inconsistent that the domestic administrative authority in
Scotland should be so swiftly abolished with control falling to Parliament in
Westminster.
The English-dominated Parliament at Westminster treated the Union with
less deference than might have been expected.0 2  Because English
constitutional theory conceived of the Crown as the supreme lawgiver, and of
Parliament as an extension of that lawgiving power,0 3 Parliament was thought
able to alter or repeal any legislative act:"~
In 1066 England was more than conquered; she was cowed ....
And now, in 1707, we have a sovereign who still stands above the
law; parliament exercises the power of compelling obedience ....
Constitutionally, the powers of a conqueror have been, through
the six preceding centuries, wrested from the crown by
parliament, yet these powers have been retained intact.'05
If the English-dominated Parliament could have attributed this kind of power
to itself, it also could have seen the Union as a product of its own action (and
not as a joint undertaking of the former Scottish and English parliaments).'°
100 Id. at 55.
'0' Union with England Act, 1707, art. XVIII (providing that only "laws concerning
regulation of trade, customs, and... excises" be imposed on Scotland as a direct effect of the
Union; that other public laws should remain the same in Scotland, though the Parliament at
Westminister had the power to modify them; and' that no private laws in Scotland could be
modified by Parliament at Westminster "except for evident utility of the subjects within
Scotland).
'02 Compare SMITH, supra note 2, at 53 (describing Parliamentary actions that seem to
contradict the spirit of the Union), with Union with England Act, 1707, art. XVIII.
103 MACNEILL, supra note 11, at 108.
"o4 See SMrIrH, supra note 2, at 57-59 (summarizing two views, by either of which the
Parliament at Westminster was acting within its powers in altering the Union: "English theories
that Parliament is an unlimited sovereign, and can lawfully vary any conditions of the Union by
ordinary legislation," and a prevailing theory as expressed in a 1953 House of Lords opinion
holding that Parliament might not be able to alter fundamental constitutional documents with
"ordinary legislation" but, either way, no judicial body is competent to assess whether
Parliament was acting beyond its powers).
'05 MACNEILL, supra note 11, at 108.
'06 SMrH, supra note 2, at 57 (describing the English theory that Parliament could as
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Finally, since the assumptions carried into the new Parliament were mostly
those of English constitutional tradition, and were not representative of Scottish
legal history, it was as if the pre-union English Parliament simply took in a few
Scottish representatives in return for complete control over Scotland." 7
Under this interpretation of Parliament's power, England and Scotland
would not have united; rather, England would have been like a conqueror of
Scotland, Scotland having transferred sovereignty to the English
government.10 8 Yet, considering that the Union was actually a dissolution of
the two prior legislatures and the establishment of a new lawmaking body, it
is unclear
why it should have been supposed that the new Parliament of
Great Britain must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of the
English Parliament but none of the Scottish Parliament, as if all
that happened in 1707 was that Scottish representatives were
admitted to the Parliament of England. That is not what was
done. "°
This is further evidence of the continued vitality of the Scottish constitution,
and points again to the fundamental difference between the Scottish and
English constitutions. Whereas the English constitution grew out of an impulse
to control the people with government, the Scottish constitution represented an
attempt by the people to put their governors under their control." 0 Certainly,
the Scottish commissioners who negotiated the Union would not have expected
a wholesale departure from their previous constitutional scheme, but the
English-dominated parliament at Westminster did, in a real way, make such a
departure. "'
Shortly after the passage of the Union and in the decades that followed,
Parliament changed or revoked several aspects of it.1" 2 Only some of these
changes were permissible under the Union, some sections were made at least
sovereign repeal or alter provisions of any law, including the Union).
'07 See infra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing effect of perpetuation of English
assumption of "unlimited sovereignty").
108 But see Elspeth Reid, Scotland (Report 1), in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE
THIRD LEGALFAMILY 201,201 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 2001) ("Scotland did not transfer
sovereignty to England: she voluntarily entered into the Treaty of Union of 1707.").
' MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, [ 1953] S.C. (H.L.) 396,411 (Scot.); SMITH, supra note 2,
at 57.
110 MACNEILL, supra note 11, at 16.
.. SMITH, supra note 2, at 57.
"2 Id. at 55.
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partially revocable, but other sections made no mention of revocability, or were
specifically irrevocable." 3 Since, as some scholars argue, the Union "took
effect as a skeletal, but nonetheless fundamental, written constitution for the
new Kingdom of Great Britain," '114 variance of the irrevocable articles would
necessarily be in contravention of the Scottish and British constitutions.
As an example of such unconstitutional variation, the Heritable Jurisdictions
Act of 1746 abolished heritable jurisdictions in Scotland," 5 the preservation of
which had been guaranteed under Article XX of the Union."6 The Act was in
response to Highland uprisings and general dispute of the royal succession. "
7
The immediate effect of this Act was to revoke clan chiefs' traditional
jurisdictional powers, including their ability to call men to arms."8 Another
instance of parliamentary disregard for the Union occurred with the malt tax
of 1713.19 Article XIII of the Union Agreement read "that during the
continuance of the Duty payable in England on Malt ... Scotland shall not be
charged with that Duty."'2 ° The malt tax, however, declared that "all Malt
made in Scotland, not to be consumed there, which.., shall be brought into
England, Wales, or the Town of Berwick upon Tweed... the Sum of six pence
per Bushel... for the same Malt, shall be paid to such officer before landing
thereof.''1. This tax was not well-received by the people of Scotland, being
both economically inequitable and in contravention of the Union Agreement. 
122
113 Id. (noting that some provisions, such as Article XIX, were "expressly made liable to
variation," while other provisions "were expressly made irrevocable")
114 Id.
1" Heritable Jurisdictions Act, 1746, 20 Geo. 2, c. 43 (Scot.).
116 Union with England Act, 1707, Scot. Parl. Acts xi 406, c. 7, art. XX, available at http://
www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1706/10/257.
117 See Encyclopedia Britannica, United Kingdom: Britain from 1742 to 1754, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/615557/United-Kingdom/44893/Britain-from- 1742-to-
1754#ref-=ref483271 (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) (noting that James II was expelled to France
following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, but his son and, as of 1744, grandson continued to
claim the family's right to succession; being Scots, they found much support in Scotland).
18 See Proceedings of the Scottish Parliament, Debate on Highland Clearances (Sept. 27,
2000), transcript available at http://www.his.com/-rory/hlndclr.html ("Formerly, the Scottish
kings, without a standing army, had found it necessary to delegate authority to subjects who in
return were granted large areas of land. Consequently, the power of a chief lay in the number
of men he could call to arms. The Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 1746 ended that
prerogative and landlords, as real money replaced barter, began to make their land commercial
through improvement and charging higher rent. The old system of township farming, in which
rent was paid mostly in kind, became increasingly uneconomic.").
119 WALKER, supra note 16, at 156.
120 Union with England Act, 1707, art. XIII.
121 Taxation, etc. Act, 1712, 12 Ann. c. 2, § 39 (U.K.).
122 WALKER, supra note 16, at 156.
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Another arbitrary parliamentary repeal of an irrevocable provision occurred
in 1712 with the Toleration Act,'23 which directly contravened a portion of the
Union Agreement.'24 Under this portion of the Union Agreement, the
Presbyterian Church was to "be the only Government of the Church within the
Kingdom of Scotland ... for ever [sic].' 125 Great Britain's Toleration Act,
however, "sanctioned" Episcopacy in Scotland, in a direct offense to the
Scottish clergy and government.
26
While a modem audience may interpret this increased religious tolerance
as a positive development, the change, like the others mentioned, nonetheless
exposes that particularly troubling anti-Scottish attitude held by the English-
dominated Parliament at Westminster. This same attitude of parliamentary
sovereignty had manifested itself a year earlier in Greenshield's case, which
arose from the religious strife preceding the Toleration Act.127 In that case, the
House of Lords accepted an appeal by a Scottish Episcopalian minister, who
had been "imprisoned in Edinburgh for openly using the Anglican form of
service";"' the House of Lords ultimately supported the minister's right to
continue practicing, surprising some and potentially violating the Union in two
ways.'29 As previously noted, the Union preserved the exclusivity of the
Presbyterian Church in Scotland, and this decision flew directly in the face of
that provision. 3 ' Furthermore, Article XIX of the Union preserved the
jurisdiction of Scottish courts and specifically denied to English courts "in
Westminster-hall" any jurisdiction over Scottish matters. 3 ' Lastly, the Union
did not specifically provide that the House of Commons would have
jurisdiction over Scottish appeals in cases of any kind, and so the House of
Lords did not have clearly-defined authority to rule in the case.'32
The lords, however, reasoned that the House of Lords was not one of the
"other court[s] in Westminster-hall,"' 33 but was simply the upper house of
123 Toleration Act, 1711, 10 Ann., c. 6, § 10 (U.K.).
124 WALKER, supra note 16, at 156.
121 Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Act, 1707, c. 6 (Scot.), available at http://
www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?ActiveTextDocld=1519703.
126 WALKER, supra note 16, at 156.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 158.
129 SMrrH, supra note 2, at 55.
30 Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Act, 1707, c. 6.
"3 Union with England Act, 1707, Scot. Parl. Acts xi 406, c. 7, art. XIX, available at http://
www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1 706/10/257.
132 See Reid, supra note 108, at 206 ("The Treaty of Union did not specifically provide for
Scots appeal to be taken to the House of Lords.").
' Union with England Act, 1707, art. XIX.
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Parliament.'34 Thus, with this decision, ultimate jurisdiction over Scottish civil
appeals passed to Parliament, acting in its supreme judicial capacity.'
At the same time, Scots were denied representation in the House of Lords, 36
a prohibition that continued until the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876; 137 even
after Scots Law Lords were allowed to sit on House of Lords appeals, they
were almost always in the minority. 13 8 Either way, the practice of hearing
Scots' appeals in the House of Lords has been established, "however
erroneous" it may be.139  This is another example of Parliament's undue
exercise of control, whether legislative or judicial, over the underrepresented
Scottish people.
Aside from acting unconstitutionally in the immediate aftermath of the
Union, the House of Lords also generally exerted potentially undue influence
over the Scottish legal system (as will be discussed below). Parliament's
meddling illustrates Scotland's constitutional tension with England, and Great
Britain as a whole,'" while offering a reason to afford Scotland greater judicial
independence in the future.
From about 1800 onward, Scottish appeals to the House of Lords were
frequent. 14' During this period, Scots' appeals were heard by English Law
Lords, most of whom were ignorant of Scots law and some of whom even
admitted this ignorance. 42 Thus, "[i]t is not surprising that decisions of the
Lords continued to be worthless as statements of Scots law and, so far as
influential, to be seriously detrimental to the principles of Scots law.' 43 A
telling example is the case of Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid,'" in which the
widow of a coal miner sued her husband's employer after a co-worker's
negligence caused him to fall to his death. Under Scots law, the Scottish
1s4 See Reid, supra note 108, at 206 (stating that via the Earl ofRoseberry v. Pirrie and the
Greensheild's case, "the House of Lords accepted jurisdiction of Scots appeal").
135 WALKER, supra note 16, at 158.
136 Reid, supra note 108, at 206.
131 SeeAppellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876,40 Vict., c.59, § 6 (U.K.) ("Forthe purpose ofaiding
the House of Lords in hearing and determination of appeals, Her Majesty may... by letters
patent appoint ... qualified persons to be Lords of Appeal in Ordinary .... A person shall not
be qualified to be appointed by Her Majesty a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary unless he has been...
(b) an advocate in Scotland, or a solicitor entitled to appear in the Court of Session and the High
Court of Judiciary ... ").
38 Reid, supra note 108, at 206.
139 WALKER, supra note 16, at 158.
'4 This tension implies a surviving, if beleaguered, Scottish constitution.
'4' WALKER, supra note 16, at 171.
142 Id.
143 Id.
'" Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, (1858) 3 Macq. 266 (H.L.).
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Session Court decided, the employer was liable for the negligence of his
workers, including negligence against other employees.
45
The rule in England, though, was the "Doctrine of Common Employment,"
which stated that "a master is not responsible for negligent harm done by one
of his servants to a fellow-servant engaged in a common employment with
him."'" Though the employer relied upon this rule, the Scottish Session Court
rejected the argument. 47 The widow and her family won in that Scottish court,
but on the employer's appeal to the House of Lords, an English Lord
imperiously queried, "[b]ut if such be the law of England, on what ground can
it be argued not to be the law of Scotland?"'14 The mere utterance of this
question belies ignorance, not only of Scots law, but of the terms of the Union.
Although it was never a part of Scots law, the English Doctrine of Common
Employment was imported (though repealed by statute in 1948) to the
detriment of Scottish workers and their families.
49
HI. RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
A. The Scotland Act of 1998
The constitutional arrangement after the Union of 1707 remained fairly
constant for quite some time, though since at least the mid-twentieth century
that arrangement was matched by an undercurrent of support for greater
independence from the Parliament at Westminster.50 In 1978, this movement
towards independence culminated in a failed attempt at devolution. The
Scotland Act of 1978 passed in Parliament, and would have devolved
significant powers to Scotland, but the referendum required for its
implementation found support among only 33% of the electorate.' 5' The 1978
Act was revoked in 1979, at which time a vote of no confidence ousted the
Labour government and the new Conservative regime took power.'52
145 Id.
146 JOHN W. SALmOND, THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.8 (R.F.V. Heuston & R.A. Buckley eds.,
12th ed. 1992) (1907).
147 Bartonshill Coal Co., 3 Macq. at 285.
148 id.
'4 WALKER, supra note 16, at 171 & n.46.
ISo The Scottish Parliament, History, The Path to Devolution, http://www.scottish.parliament.
uk/vli/history/pathtodevolution/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) [hereinafter The Path to
Devolution].
151 Id.
152 Id.
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The Conservative government allowed some devolution to Scotland and
Wales but, fearing the dissolution of Great Britain, did not allow for the same
degree of independence countenanced by the 1978 Act.' In the late 1980s,
representatives from several Scottish political parties began meeting to discuss
the constitutional situation, and in 1989 this group united with other Scottish
church and business leaders to form the Scottish Constitutional Convention
(SCC).'54 After meeting for several years, the SCC produced its final report in
1995, entitled Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right. 55 The report was
notable for the lack of arguments in direct support of independence; rather, the
SCC furnished proposals for implementation of devolution, the "momentum
for change" being simply "too great to deny." ' 6
Whether the pro-devolution tone was a persuasive strategy or indicative of
a sincerely conservative approach, the report had a significant impact.
Following its release, and based on its recommendations, the Labour
government staged a referendum and prepared for the introduction of a new
Scotland Bill.5 7 The September 11, 1997 referendum contained two items,
both of which passed overwhelmingly: the people of Scotland expressed their
will that a Scottish Parliament be established and that such a Parliament have
tax-varying powers.'58 The new Scotland Bill was introduced in 1997 and
became law in January 1998.159 By late 1999, the first Scottish Parliamentary
elections and meetings had taken place, and the Queen had officially opened
the new Scottish Parliament at Holyrood. 6 ° There have been two subsequent
Scottish Parliament elections, in 2003 and 2007.161
The contours of the Scotland Act create a quasi-federal silhouette, as the
Act devolves to Scotland whatever powers are not reserved to Westminster.162
The long and detailed list of powers reserved to the Parliament at Westminster
includes, most notably, changes to the constitution and the union arrangement
153 Id.
154 Id.
5 SCOTnSHCONSTTUTIONAL CONVENTION, SCOTLAND'S PARLIAMENT, SCOTLAND'S RIGHT
(1995), available at http://www.almac.co.uk/businesspark/scc/scc-rep.htm.
156 Id.
' The Path to Devolution, supra note 150.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
16' HELEN HOLDEN, PARLIAMENT AND CONST. CTR., THE UK DEVOLVED LEGISLATURES:
SOME COMPARISONs BETWEEN THEIR POWERS AND WORK 4 (Nov. 9,2007), available at http://
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-04505.pdf.
162 See Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 29(2)(b) (providing that an act of Scottish Parliament is
law unless it relates to a matter reserved to Westminster, inter alia), available at http://www.
opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl 998/ukpga_19980046_en_1.
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of Scotland and England, international commerce and economic policy, and
elections to supranational organizations such as the European Parliament.
63
Speaking broadly, the devolved powers include the authority to make primary
and secondary legislation on many issues.'" These devolved powers are
significant and numerous, and include topics from public health, education, and
tourism, to economic and industrial development, criminal (and most civil)
law, as well as agriculture, forestry, and fishing. 165 The Act also gives the
Scottish Parliament the ability to vary the income-tax rate.
166
Some specific exceptions to reserved powers are enlightening: though the
Act reserves to Westminster the control of imports and exports, the Scottish
Parliament retains control over the "prohibition and regulation of movement
into and out of Scotland of food, animals, animal products," and the like.
67
Lastly, the Scotland Act stipulates that the Acts of Union of 1706-1707 remain,
in effect, subject to the Scotland Act. 168 The resulting scheme divides power
asymmetrically between the Scottish Parliament and the Parliament at
Westminster.
The competency of the Scottish Parliament is relatively far-reaching, and
a great deal of democratic power has been handed back to the Scottish people.
Once more, Scottish control most domestic affairs, and the preservation of
Scots Law (as stipulated in the Union) remains. The broad range of powers is
striking when compared to the devolution arrangement with Northern
Ireland. 69 Many similar areas are devolved to each legislature, but the Scottish
Parliament has additional areas of competency. Notable examples include most
aspects of criminal and civil law (including prosecutions and the courts), local
government, some transportation infrastructure and planning, and public
records, none of which fall within Northern Ireland's domestic competency. 7 '
163 Id. sched. 5, §§ A1, B3; HOLDEN, supra note 161, at 7-8.
'6' HOLDEN, supra note 161, at 7-8. Primary legislation is law, typically statutory-made by
Act of Parliament or by the sovereign's prerogative (e.g., royal warrants, royal proclamations),
while "secondary legislation," or "subordinate legislation," "is made under powers conferred by
or under statute on Her Majesty in Council or on a Minister, Department, the National Assembly
for Wales or other body or person." HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, STATUTORY
INSTRUMENT PRACTICE 1.2.1 (3d ed. 2003), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/official-publ
ications/publishing-guidance/si-practice.doc.
165 HOLDEN, supra note 161, at 8.
166 Scotland Act, 1998, § 73.
167 Id. sched. 5, § C5.
168 Id. § 37.
169 See HOLDEN, supra note 161, at 6-7 (outlining Northern Ireland devolution arrangement,
which divides competency into excepted, reserved, or transferred powers).
170 Id.
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Thus, the U.K. Parliament has recognized the distinct needs of each kingdom,
and has allowed a somewhat wider range of power to the Scottish Parliament.
The Scottish constitution continues to develop alongside the British
constitution, and it has received more room to grow. On the other hand,
Westminster continues to control important aspects of sovereignty, many of
which are undeniably essential for the viability of any independent state. With
control of international affairs and economic policy resting in British hands,
and with the all-important ability to alter the Union and its constitution
remaining outside of Scottish control, it is clear that Scotland's full
independence is not yet in effect. The Scotland Act, like devolution in general,
presents a tension between the people, their home rulers, and the British
authority which still controls so much.
17 1
B. The U.K. Supreme Court
In 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that he was
abolishing the office of Lord Chancellor, and introducing legislation that would
establish a United Kingdom Supreme Court (the Court). 72 The new Court
assumed the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords and the devolution
jurisdiction of the Privy Council (meaning it handles challenges to the
legislative competency of devolved legislatures, such as the Scottish
Parliament), and consists of twelve justices.17 ' There are still no criminal
appeals from Scotland."7 Of course, not everyone in the U.K. has accepted the
change enthusiastically or trustingly:
Nothing has been worse handled by the Prime Minister than his
judicial reforms. He did not consult the law lords; he did not
consult the Lord Chief Justice; he could not get the past Lord
Chancellor's agreement .... He thought he had abolished the
office of Lord Chancellor, which he did not have the power to
do.
1 75
171 This tension will be explained and explored as part of the analysis in Part IV, infra.
172 Press Release, Prime Minister's Office, Lord Falconer Appointed Secretary of State for
Constitutional Affairs (June 12,2003), http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3894; Robert Walker,
The New Supreme Court and Other Changes in the Justice System, 6 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 292
(2006).
'71 U.K. Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court, http://www.justice.gov.uk/whatwedo/supremeco
urt.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Supreme Court]; Walker, supra note 172, at 293.
174 Walker, supra note 172, at 293.
"7 William Rees-Mogg, The Supreme Court: Isn 't There Some Law Against It?, TIMES
ONLINE (U.K.), Aug. 4,2003, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/william-
2010]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Whether or not Blair had the authority to perform what he had declared in the
press release, the reforms are coming to pass. The Constitutional Reform Act
of 2005 was an important step in this process: "[The Act] modifies the office
of Lord Chancellor and.., the way in which some of the functions vested in
that office are to be exercised. The Act also creates the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom and abolishes the appellate jurisdiction of the House of
Lords.' 76 The Court began its first term in 2009.177
There may be several reasons for the change. Perhaps the most facially
obvious reason is an increased desire for the independence of the judiciary. 178
Whereas the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords required that the
upper house of the legislative body also act in a judicial capacity, the justices
of the new Supreme Court act only in ajudicial capacity. 79 The Constitutional
Reform Act requires the first justices of the new Supreme Court to be twelve
Law Lords from the House of Lords who are in office when the Court begins
its session; they will be subsequently disqualified from sitting in legislative
sessions as members of the House of Lords.180  The reason for the
disqualification is to ensure that "[t]he court will be an independent institution,
presided over by independently appointed law lords."''
Some argue that the Court is either an unnecessary creation or a truly bad
idea. This is because the Law Lords have been capable of separating their
legislative and judicial roles, with the new Court merely an attempt by the
executive to isolate from Parliament a stumbling block that-because of its
rees mogg/article856607.ece.
176 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Explanatory Notes, 3, available at http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/ACTS/acts2005/en/ukpgaen_20050004_en.pdf.
'17 Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice, http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/supremecourt.htm
(last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
178 Walker, supra note 172, at 292 ("Within the principled [reasons for the change] I include
the embarrassment which the British Government may have felt in its dealings with the Council
of Europe, at a time when many former iron-curtain countries were seeking admission to the
European Union, at a constitution under which the individual who was (at least in theory) the
most senior judge was also a cabinet minister and speaker of the upper house of the legislature,
and under which the highest court of appeal was (at least in theory) merely a committee of the
upper house.").
179 See Supreme Court, supra note 173 ("The introduction of a Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom provides greater clarity in our constitutional arrangements by further separating the
judiciary from the legislature.").
180 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, §§ 23-24 (U.K.), available athttp://www.opsi.gov.
uk/ACTS/acts2005/ukpga_20050004_en-1; GLENNDYMoND, HOUSE OFLORDSLIBRARYNOTE,
THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 17-19 (Nov. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/hllappellate.pdf.
Is' Crimlinks, October 1, 2009: New UK Supreme Court, http://www.crimlinks.com/Oct32
009.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
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ancient prestige and significance-they say would be better to maintain.'8 2
Others, however, see the Court as an appropriate innovation, bringing the U.K.
in line with the democratic checks and balances its neighbors and
allies-European nations and the-value so highly.'
The Ministry of Justice says the Court will "provide greater clarity in [the
U.K.'s] constitutional arrangements by further separating the judiciary from thelegislature." ''
Either way, the new Court's implications for Scotland are unclear. It is
possible that very little change will be felt at the local or regional levels. On
the one hand, challenges to devolution legislation will now be heard by the
Court, instead of by the Privy Council.' On the other hand, Scottish criminal
appeals remain beyond the Court's jurisdiction.8 6 Scotland does have a say in
the selection ofjustices; the First Minister of Scotland must be consulted as to
each appointee. 7 Although it is unclear whether the introduction of a U.K.
Supreme Court will have a distinct impact on Scotland, it is undeniable that the
development is part of a trend toward an arguably stronger democracy, further
decentralization, devolution of powers, and greater recognition of the various
national identities within the United Kingdom.
C. The European Community
The United Kingdom has long been part of the European Union, and is
bound by certain rules and decisions made by various other European
supranational bodies.' Evidence of this overriding influence, and of particular
constitutional significance for the U.K. and Scotland, is the European
Convention on Human Rights.8 9 As enacted by the U.K. Parliament in 1998,
the Human Rights Act represents a new set of constitutional standards that are
112 Walker, supra note 172; Rees-Mogg, supra note 175.
'3 See Walker, supra note 172, at 292 (reluctantly attributing a "principled" reason for the
change by Blair to the pressure from the Council of Europe for a more democratic separation of
powers in the U.K.).
"s Supreme Court, supra note 173.
185 Constitution Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 40(4)(b).
16 The Scottish Government, Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System § 1.2.2
(2010), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/01/19154813/3.
187 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, § 27(2)(c).
188 See British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Britain in the European Union, http://www.
fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/institutions/britain-in-the-european-union/ (last visited Apr. 8,2010)
(noting the United Kingdom has been a member nation since 1973).
189 Walker, supra note 172, at 295.
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externally imposed.' 9° According to its preamble, the Human Rights Act exists
"to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European
Convention on Human Rights."'' By the terms of the Human Rights Act,
primary and secondary U.K. legislation is to be given effect in a manner
compatible with the Convention. 92 It is binding on Scotland, and would
continue to be so were Scotland to become independent and join the European
community (Scotland is already represented in the European Parliament). 93
Thus, by this Act the Parliament at Westminster has incorporated another
written document into its constitution-another example of the constitutional
change occurring in the U.K., the move toward written documents that
establish constitutional principles, and Parliament's derogation of power over
the essential constitutional issue of human rights. 94
IV. ANALYSIS: PATHS TO INDEPENDENCE
The tide of Scottish independence already engulfs the United Kingdom's
constitution, defining an ever-shrinking coastline of parliamentary power. This
tide potentially demands two things. First, the Parliament at Westminster
ought to allow an independence referendum in Scotland. Second, and in the
alternative, a more conservative "legislative path" is available: the Scottish
Parliament can handle, and should be given, the power to make the primary
legislation that is currently within the exclusive competence of Parliament at
Westminster.
The Scotland Act devolved many powers to Scotland.'95 Among those
reserved to the Parliament at Westminster is the power to effect constitutional
change in Great Britain; Parliament also controls matters of devolution. 9 6 As
190 Id.
"' Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, pmbl. (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/AC
TS/actsl998/ukpga.19980042_en_1.
192 Id. § 3(l).
193 UK Office of the European Parliament, Office in Scotland, available at http://www.euro
parl.org.uk/scotland (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
194 This Convention, which surely would remain binding on an independent Scottish
constitution, finally addresses the issue of which human rights are guaranteed by the Scottish
constitution. Cf SMrrH, supra note 2, at 79 (noting that "there is no written code setting forth
the fundamental liberties in Scotland").
95 See supra Part 1II.A (detailing the powers devolved to Scotland, including the power to
make secondary domestic legislation, and the power to vary the income tax).
196 See supra Part 111.4 (enumerating some of the powers reserved to the Parliament at
Westminster, especially the exclusive power to enact changes to the United Kingdom constitution).
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history has shown,'97 a popular referendum can induce Parliament to take
action toward decentralization of its power. Scotland is thus faced with a
difficult situation: it seeks to gain independence from the very body that must
approve (indeed, must be the one to perform) any actions toward that goal.
Likely, Parliament will be less than willing to increase Scottish independence
on its own, as this would mean a significant reduction in power.
Balancing this inherent obstacle, though, is the willingness of Parliament to
listen to the people. A referendum that is supported by two-thirds of the
eligible voting population will carry significant weight.9 The real question,
then, is whether the popular support for such a referendum exists. Fergus
Ewing, a ranking member of the Scottish National Party and Member of the
Scottish Parliament (MSP), provides an answer, citing a "national identity" poll
in which Scottish citizens were asked how they identify themselves.' Sixty
percent of respondents identified themselves either as Scottish and not British,
or as more Scottish than British (these responses were roughly equal to one
another); another 27% said they were equally Scottish and British.2° Only 3%
said they were more British than Scottish, and 9% said they were British, not
Scottish. °
Under the argument that self-identified national groups ought to be afforded
"their autonomous place in a fraternity of equals, 2 °2 the poll provides
convincing evidence both that a referendum would be successful and that it is
a good idea in the first place. Ewing quotes a "young Scot" who puts it wittily,
and bluntly: "I don't dislike the English. I don't dislike the Norwegians either.
But I'd rather not be governed by either of them., 213 This poll data is
supported by the fundamental differences between the Scottish and English
constitutions, as discussed above, and by the hundreds of years of oppression
England has imposed on Scotland. Still, it seems unlikely that Parliament will
countenance a referendum any time soon.3°
197 See supra Parts II.A, IV (discussing the ancient Scottish tradition recognizing the primacy
of the people, and the recent history of constitutional reform).
' Ewing & Erickson, supra note 6, at 93.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 93 tbl. I.
201 Id.; According to 2001 Census, more than 409,000 of Scotland's residents were born in
England-about 8% of Scotland's population. See Scotland's Census Results Online (SCROL),
SCROL Browser (Apr. 29, 2001), http://scrol.gov.uk/scrol/browser/profile.jsp (8.08% of the
total resident population of 5,062.011).
202 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED CoMMuNmIEs 84(1996).
203 Ewing &Erickson, supra note 6, at 93.
204 See id. at 98-99 (detailing the results of a poll where 59% responded "likely" and 41%
"unlikely" to the question "At any time in the next twenty years, do you think it is likely or
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Due to the unlikelihood of complete independence via popular referendum,
a more conservative approach might gain support in the U.K. Parliament. The
other option, though it entails continued sovereignty for the Parliament at
Westminster, is a greater breadth of devolution competency for the Scottish
Parliament. The primary argument for this option stems from the tension
inherent in the present devolution scheme, a tension that makes the current
arrangement seem untenable.2 °5
For example, there is tension between the provisions of the Scotland Act
that provide Parliament at Westminster shall have competency over issues of
international relations and commerce, and that Scotland shall retain control
over the development of agriculture and industry and the export of animals and
animal products.2"6 This tension surfaced in 1999, at the height of the "Mad
Cow Disease," a crisis which had plagued Great Britain since 1986.207 This
was a situation in which certain farming practices, particularly the use of meat
and bone meal (MBM) in animal feed, led to the outbreak of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or Mad Cow Disease); as a result, British
beef was taken off the international market and thousands of cows were
euthanized.2"'
In October of 2000, France's Prime Minister Lionel Jospin offered to lift the
ban on some British beef, specifically herds of exclusively grass-fed Angus
cattle from the Aberdeen region.2 In a private phone call between the French
and British leaders, Prime Minister Tony Blair unilaterally rejected the offer,
presumably because he felt any re-opening of trade should apply to the U.K.
as a whole.2 0 Blair did not consult Scottish officials or industry leaders. 1
Moreover, the continuation of this ban almost certainly had negative (perhaps
devastating) effects on Scottish farmers: "Scottish beef exports topped £18
unlikely that Scotland will become completely independent from the United Kingdom?").
205 Id.
20 Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 37, sched. 5, C5, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/
acts1998/ukpga__19980046_en_1.
207 BSE ADVISORY COMMITrEE, Finding and Conclusions, in 1 THE BSE INQuIRY REPORT 1
(2000), available at http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.
gov.uk/report/index.htm.
200 Id. at 1, 13.
209 Colin Brown et al., Blair Rejected Jospin Deal on Scottish Beef, INDEPENDENT (U.K.),
Dec. 15, 1999, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/blair-rejected-jospin-deal-on-scottish-beef-
1132429.html.
2 0 Id. ("Mr [sic] Blair turned it down immediately as 'unworkable' without telling colleagues
because it would have undermined the national date-based scheme backed by the European
Commission.").
211 Id.; see also Ewing & Erickson, supra note 6, at 95 (discussing the same incident, from
the perspective of a leader of the Scottish National Parliament (SNP)).
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million following the reopening of exports in May 2006," evidencing the
significant revenues that were lost and that could have been realized years
earlier.212
Under part of the Scotland Act, which reserved international relations and
commerce to Parliament, Blair seems to have had some authority to make this
move. On the other hand, the Scotland Act also allows Scotland to control
agricultural development and the export of animals. As applied in this
situation, these provisions work in contradiction to one another, illustrating the
tension inherent in the current devolution arrangement, making greater
legislative freedom for Scotland a clearly advantageous alternative. Whereas
the conflicting provisions may be defended as an attempt to strike a balance of
power "for the evident utility of the Scottish people" (to paraphrase the
Union),213 it seems more like another attempt by the Parliament at Westminster
to confuse issues, using legislation and usurping Scottish authority to act in an
unjustified and paternal way. Even if an independence referendum is not in the
near future, a re-working of the current power arrangement seems in order and
would be a positive legislative step toward Scottish independence.
The new U.K. Supreme Court likewise provides an opportunity for
increased Scottish independence. As described above, the Court presents some
significant changes from the current appellate regime. First, the members of
the Court are independently appointed, and the Scottish First Minister
(alongside the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and
the Assembly First Secretary for Wales) have to be consulted with each
appointment.2"4 This guarantees Scottish input on a roughly equal footing to
that of the other national representatives. Second, one judicial body (the U.K.
Supreme Court) now has jurisdiction over devolution challenges and any
justiciable Scottish appeals. This is much different from the former
arrangement, under which the Privy Council handled devolution questions and
the House of Lords handled appeals. Hopefully, this arrangement will provide
a uniform treatment of Scottish questions.
Lastly, the constitutional change, engendered by the establishment of the
U.K. Supreme Court, continues the momentum of reform. It is clear that
Scottish criminal appeals are not within the powers of the Court. It is also
clear, under the Union, that the continuation of Scots law generally is
2"2 Press Release, The Scottish Government, Scottish Meat Back on the Menu in Europe
(Oct. 14, 2007), http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2007/1 0/15130834.
211 Union with England Act, 1707, Scot. Parl. Acts xi 406, c. 7, art. XVIII, available at http://
www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1706/10/257.
214 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 27(2), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
ACTS/acts2005/ukpga_20050004_en_1.
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constitutionally guaranteed. The appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords
was dubious to start with, and probably deleterious to Scots law (with English
Law Lords wrongly deciding questions of Scots law, thus artificially modifying
the Scottish common law which was itself dubiously imported). Creating a
new, more independent judicial body removes some of the risk of English
"home cooking" or impartiality when it comes to decisions regarding Scots
law.
One might ask why any Scottish appeals continue to be within the
jurisdiction of the new Supreme Court. The establishment of the Court
presents an opportunity for undoing the historical wrong that was, arguably,
perpetrated by the years of Anglo-centric judicial decisions that have
influenced the course of Scots law. Moreover, the preservation of Scots law,
alongside the non-justiciability of criminal appeals, brings out another tension
in the devolution arrangement. It seems to make more sense that Scots law
matters are generally beyond the jurisdiction of the U.K. courts. Still, this new
Supreme Court could provide increased judicial independence for Scotland.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of Scottish independence is inherently political and, as such,
raises many policy issues. While these issues are not always law-centered,
contextual examples may inform the overall legal discussion. Thus, this Note
references economic policy and some recent history. On the whole, though, the
present argument is one of constitutionally justified legislative and judicial
independence. The potential for political action is beyond the scope of this
discussion," 5 as is the balancing of economic viability, tax policy, and social
issues. What is clear is that at least some constitutional justification exists for
Scotland to regain complete independence from Great Britain. With any luck,
the devolutionary momentum will continue, and the Parliament at Westminister
will one day follow the current trajectory to its logical conclusion: freedom for
Scotland.
215 It is not, as Ewing and Erickson wittily point out, a discussion motivated by
"patriotism... stirred watching an Australian actor wear a kilt in an American movie set in the
Irish countryside." Ewing & Erickson, supra note 6, at 89.
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